Reading "Loving Nature"

Today I began to read Loving Nature: Towards an ecology of emotion by Kay Milton. I've read half of the book and plan to read a chapter a day this week until I finish it. This is the first truly academic work I've read so far (and about time, too...) and it's done a great job so far of filling in that void of scholarly theory I've been missing. It's at once a bit overwhelming (information overload) and exciting (lots of material to write about now...).

The book seeks to construct a theory of how people come to relate to and love nature. The author discusses theories of emotion and perception grounded in the work of mostly psychologists and anthropologists. She clearly has her own arguments and opinions, but she nevertheless gives a good overview of those that she seeks to overturn. There are lots of cited references to lead me to further research. One cited work that I intend to check out is J. Barry's Rethinking Green Politics for his idea that we need to "re-enchant" ourselves with nature.

Some ideas from Milton that stick out to me so far, which I think will be useful later on:

- The extent to which people "care about" nature depends at least in part on whether nature is seen as having "personhood." Personhood refers to beings that have intention (i.e. a religious entity, or rock/tree/animal spirits, or animals as being intelligent beings). A concept or thing that is imbued with a sense of personhood is also seen as having rights, which makes it a moral imperative to act responsibly in relation to this concept/thing. This "personal" view of nature is in contrast to a "impersonal" view of nature, more dominant in science and in modernist western ways of thinking, in which nature is seen as governed by mechanistic principles that have no purpose or meaning.

- Idea of "relational epistemology" - On page 47, there is a discussion of Nayaka hunter-gatherers' tendency to focus on events in their environment rather than objects and individuals, what something "does" rather than "is." Milton goes on to suggest that, through this world view, a sense of personhood can arise out of the way something responds to or relates to other things, such as ourselves — whether it moves or changes as a result of stimuli, for instance. Thus, the reason we relate best to other humans is not because they are human, but because they happen to relate the most closely and responsively to us. (A kind of radical idea that I intuitively feel is missing something... but it's an interesting idea.) She also proposes that relational epistemology is common to all human cultures, not just hunter-gatherer societies — and it persists despite rigorous scientific training. (52)

- A sense of personhood does not always yield sympathy. Milton gives an example of a fox: the animal perceived as a "thief" (which is a human construct) by the farmer, and is therefore loathed. (50)

- Milton observes that the most dominant way of viewing nature today is that of the impersonal, in large part due to a convenient alliance between science and economics. Science has a tendency to depersonalize nature; Milton attributes this mainly to the most popular mode of explaination in science, which is hierarchical reductionism (I don't really understand this line of thought yet... will read more on what hierarchical reductionism actually is). Milton argues that because economics (in the form of capitalism) is western societies' dominant force, and because science "serves capitalism very well" by making exploitation of nature morally acceptable through depersonalization, we have come to see nature in the scientific mode — as predominantly impersonal. This feels a bit over-simplified to me... so I'd like to read more about this, as Milton only gives a few paragraphs on this topic. (But she does set up an interesting comparison between modern society and early animistic societies in how they thank - or not thank - nature for providing economic resources - p53)

- Love of nature is closely linked to enjoyment of nature, as evident in anecdotal accounts from avid conservationists, in how they converse enthusiastically about hiking, camping, birdwatching, and other forms of outdoor recreation. But there is a sense that linking love to enjoyment trivializes the need for conservation; there is a story in the book about developers who scoff at birdwatchers protesting the destruction of a bird habitat, because their concern is relegated to the status of "hobby" rather than some serious concern like profit or progress.

- The biophilia hypothesis, which proposes that we have an innate predisposition to respond emotionally to life and life-like processes, is a potentially powerful argument for conservationists. It implies that, were biodiversity to suffer and nature to disappear, we as human beings would suffer emotional impoverishment.

- Emotions serve as learning mechanisms in that they increase incidence of retention (in memory) and therefore knowledge. (Interesting but probably not too related idea: emotions and logic are therefore NOT as mutually opposing as conventionally thought; there can be no knowledge without emotion.) So love of forests can lead to a desire to learn more about forests. The opposite also works: knowledge about forests leads to understanding and eventually love for them.

Clearly that is a lot to think about right now, but writing it all down helps. And all of this is helpful in starting to think about what environmental factors in an architectural space could spur all these feelings and ideas about nature.

One last note: Milton hasn't spent a lot of pages discussing various ways of defining nature (cultural differences, etc.). She also begins the book by saying that whenever she uses an ambiguous word like "societies," it should be assumed that she means contemporary western. Thereafter it is implied that she means "nature" in the way that [western] conservationists mean "nature" — the great outdoors, wild animals, undisturbed habitats, etc. She does not mean nature in the sense of "human nature" or "the natural" so much.

I'm wondering if it would be a good idea in my thesis to also make these initial disclaimers/acknowledgements of limitations. Is it necessary/expected in academic literature? Is it a sign of leaky scholarship to not be as all-inclusive as possible? Or is it ok because sometimes it simply is impossible to be that thorough and assumptions/self-imposed limitations need to happen in order to proceed? Which is better?

Off to sleep with lots to ponder...